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THE	  IMPEACHMENT	  OF	  PRESIDENT	  DILMA	  ROUSSEFF:	  OLD	  POLITICS	  MEETS	  NEW	  STANDARDS	  IN	  BRAZIL	  Thomas	  C.	  Bruneau	  	  On	  May	  28,	  2016,	  the	  Brazilian	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	  Raul	  Jungmann,	  gave	  a	  long	  interview	  with	  the	  Estado	  de	  São	  Paulo	  newspaper.	  In	  the	  long	  interview	  he	  barely	  touched	  upon	  military	  or	  defense	  issues,	  merely	  lauding	  the	  military’s	  neutrality	  in	  the	  current	  chaotic	  political	  situation.	  However,	  he	  did	  highlight	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  Brazilian	  politics.	  He	  noted	  that	  while	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1988	  strengthened	  accountability	  institutions,	  naming	  specifically	  the	  Public	  Ministry,	  the	  Federal	  Police,	  and	  the	  Judiciary,	  politics	  had	  not	  changed.	  In	  his	  terms,	  politics	  is	  a	  hostage	  to	  itself.	  	  These	  observations	  by	  a	  seasoned	  politician,	  one	  who	  has	  twice	  served	  as	  both	  federal	  minister	  and	  federal	  deputy,	  permit	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  impeachment	  of	  President	  Dilma	  Rousseff.	  	  Despite	  allegations	  by	  President	  Rousseff	  that	  she	  was	  deposed	  in	  a	  golpe,	  a	  coup,	  the	  process	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1988.	  This	  is	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  other	  issues	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  situation,	  including	  her	  narrow	  reelection	  in	  2014,	  lackluster	  governance,	  dubious	  economic	  policies,	  exposes	  of	  massive	  graft	  and	  corruption,	  and	  miserable	  public	  opinion	  poll	  rating.	  	  While	  President	  Rousseff	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  all	  of	  these	  problems,	  she	  is	  being	  held	  to	  answer	  for	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  37	  charges	  levied	  against	  her,	  which	  is	  a	  “crime	  of	  fiscal	  responsibility”:	  fiddling	  with	  government	  accounts	  to	  facilitate	  her	  reelection	  in	  2014.	  	  	  	   Scholars	  who	  study	  the	  process	  whereby	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1988	  was	  formulated	  and	  the	  resulting	  document	  are	  extremely	  critical.	  	  In	  my	  writing	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Constitution	  did	  not	  represent	  an	  “elite	  settlement”	  ensuring	  democratic	  consolidation,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Spain,	  for	  example.	  Law	  professor,	  Keith	  S.	  Rosenn,	  states	  the	  following:	  “The	  process	  by	  which	  Brazil’s	  1988	  Constitution	  was	  adopted	  practically	  assured	  that	  the	  end	  product	  would	  be	  a	  hodgepodge	  of	  inconsistent	  and	  convoluted	  provisions.”	  1	  Despite	  the	  245	  articles	  and	  70	  transitional	  provisions,	  the	  framers	  were	  unable	  to	  resolve	  whether	  Brazil	  would	  be	  a	  monarchy	  or	  republic,	  and	  if	  the	  latter,	  a	  presidential	  or	  parliamentary	  system.	  	  These	  fundamental	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decisions	  were	  left	  for	  a	  referendum	  in	  1993	  that	  favored	  a	  presidential	  republic.	  	  The	  framers	  of	  the	  constitution,	  which	  were	  the	  559	  members	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Congress,	  maintained	  intact	  both	  the	  institutional	  defects	  of	  the	  political	  system	  and	  the	  extensive	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  that	  governed	  Brazil	  between	  1964	  and	  1985.	  	  Whereas	  the	  institutional	  defects	  of	  the	  political	  system	  continue	  until	  the	  present,	  since	  the	  system	  is,	  as	  Jungmann	  puts	  it,	  hostage	  to	  itself,	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  have	  been	  diminished	  and	  the	  accountability	  institutions	  have	  become	  robust	  and	  active.	  	  These	  three	  processes,	  the	  diminishing	  of	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  military,	  the	  vicious	  circle	  of	  the	  political	  system,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  strong	  accountability	  institutions	  are	  the	  foci	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  	  	   Both	  Rosenn	  and	  I	  detail	  the	  extensive	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  negotiated	  transition	  from	  military	  to	  civilian	  rule	  and	  the	  reliance	  of	  President	  Sarney	  on	  the	  armed	  forces	  during	  his	  five	  year	  tenure	  (1985	  –	  90).	  	  The	  most	  extensive	  work	  on	  this	  topic,	  however,	  is	  found	  in	  Alfred	  Stepan’s	  
Rethinking	  Military	  Politics:	  Brazil	  and	  the	  Southern	  Cone	  where	  he	  demonstrates,	  by	  describing	  11	  prerogatives,	  that	  Brazil	  had	  little	  progressed	  between	  military	  and	  civilian	  rule.	  	  More	  recently,	  twenty	  –	  eight	  years	  after	  Stepan	  published	  his	  book,	  scholars	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  prerogatives	  that	  were	  mainly	  high	  when	  Stepan	  wrote	  are	  today	  either	  low	  or	  moderate.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  high	  points	  of	  the	  process	  whereby	  the	  prerogatives	  were	  diminished	  or	  eliminated	  include	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  civilian	  –	  led	  ministry	  of	  defense	  in	  1999,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  decrease	  of	  military	  –	  led	  ministries	  from	  six	  to	  zero,	  and	  a	  large	  package	  of	  laws	  in	  2011	  which	  further	  delimited	  and	  restricted	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  armed	  forces.	  Today,	  the	  armed	  forces	  receive	  1.29	  %	  of	  GDP	  and	  73%	  of	  this	  goes	  to	  salaries	  and	  pensions,	  and	  the	  political	  influence	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  is	  minimal.	  	  Illustrative	  of	  the	  change	  from	  the	  military	  regime	  to	  the	  present	  day	  is	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  National	  Information	  Service,	  (Serviço	  Nacional	  de	  Informações	  SNI),	  which	  was	  the	  intelligence	  arm	  of	  the	  military	  regime,	  by	  President	  Collor	  in	  1990,	  and	  the	  creation,	  only	  after	  nine	  years,	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (Agência	  Brasileira	  de	  Inteligência	  ABIN).	  	  ABIN	  is	  prohibited	  from	  conducting	  intercepts,	  has	  a	  minimal	  budget,	  and	  lacks	  a	  direct	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link	  to	  decision	  –	  makers.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  politicians	  had	  incentives	  to	  diminish	  the	  influence	  and	  roles	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  thereby	  increasing	  their	  own.	  	  	   While	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1988	  included	  a	  great	  many	  items	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  improved	  socio	  –	  economic	  situation	  for	  Brazilians,	  it	  changed	  nothing	  regarding	  the	  political	  institutions	  that	  put	  those	  559	  politicians	  into	  the	  position	  of	  writing	  the	  constitution,	  and	  have	  made	  only	  most	  minimal	  changes	  in	  the	  intervening	  28	  years.	  	  As	  Rosenn	  states	  “The	  constituent	  assembly	  also	  did	  nothing	  to	  reform	  the	  malfunctioning	  of	  the	  political	  party	  system,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  worst.”	  2	  They	  did	  not	  establish	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  a	  party	  to	  be	  recognized,	  resulting	  in	  the	  current	  situation	  with	  35	  political	  parties	  at	  the	  national	  level	  with	  19	  having	  deputies	  in	  the	  lower	  house,	  the	  Câmara.	  They	  did	  not	  change	  the	  open	  –	  list	  system	  of	  proportional	  representation	  in	  which	  each	  state	  is	  a	  single,	  and	  at	  –	  large	  multi	  –	  member	  district.	  	  They	  did	  not	  change	  the	  gross	  misrepresentation	  whereby	  all	  states,	  and	  the	  federal	  district,	  have	  three	  senators	  or	  the	  provision	  stipulating	  that	  all	  states,	  regardless	  of	  population,	  would	  have	  a	  minimum	  of	  eight	  and	  a	  maximum	  of	  seventy	  deputies.	  	   There	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  wholesale	  revision	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  1993	  that	  would	  require	  only	  an	  absolute	  majority	  of	  the	  deputies.	  	  That	  revision	  never	  happened.	  	  Instead,	  there	  have	  been	  piecemeal	  revisions.	  In	  reviewing	  the	  various	  initiatives	  to	  revise	  the	  constitution	  between	  1988	  and	  today,	  they	  amount	  to	  very	  little.	  	  This	  is	  the	  consensus	  view	  of	  the	  experts	  on	  the	  issue	  including	  David	  Fleischer,	  Alfredo	  Montero,	  Timothy	  Power,	  and	  Keith	  Rosenn.	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1988	  was	  full	  of	  contradictions.	  The	  issue	  of	  parliamentary	  vs.	  presidential	  form	  of	  government	  was	  never	  resolved,	  neither	  in	  the	  constituent	  assembly	  nor	  after.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  constitution	  gave	  the	  congress	  a	  role	  in	  approving	  annual	  budgets	  and	  allowed	  them	  to	  overrule	  presidential	  vetoes	  with	  absolute	  majorities	  rather	  than	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  vote.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  gave	  the	  presidency	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  initiate	  and	  execute	  annual	  budgets	  and	  to	  force	  45	  –	  day	  limits	  on	  the	  congress	  to	  review	  bills	  defined	  as	  “urgent”	  by	  the	  president,	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  a	  cabinet,	  subject	  to	  Senate	  approval,	  and	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  executive	  decrees	  (medidas	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provisórias)	  which	  had	  the	  force	  of	  law	  while	  congress	  had	  30	  days	  to	  review	  the	  measure.	  	  Post	  –	  1990	  presidents	  utilized	  these	  measures,	  and	  others,	  to	  govern.	  	  	  	   Even	  with	  these	  gimmicks,	  the	  need	  to	  assemble	  a	  coalition,	  since	  no	  president	  since	  the	  first	  directly	  elected,	  President	  Collor,	  has	  belonged	  to	  a	  party	  with	  a	  majority	  in	  either	  house	  of	  congress,	  all	  presidents	  would	  have	  to	  attract	  the	  support	  of	  other	  parties.	  	  Brazil	  has	  one	  of,	  if	  not	  the	  most	  fractured,	  party	  system	  of	  any	  democracy.	  This	  form	  of	  government,	  commonly	  called	  coalitional	  presidentialism	  (presidencialismo	  de	  coalizão),	  could,	  and	  did,	  easily	  evolve	  into	  corruption.	  The	  most	  famous,	  but	  not	  the	  only,	  corruption	  scandal	  of	  President	  Luis	  Inácio	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  –Lula	  (2002	  –	  2010)	  was	  the	  “big	  monthly”	  (as	  in	  big	  monthly	  payments	  to	  members	  of	  congress	  to	  support	  his	  government’s	  policies	  in	  the	  congress),	  mensalão	  scandal.	  	  Alfred	  Montero	  has	  this	  to	  say	  on	  this	  topic.	  “The	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  vote	  –	  buying	  emerged	  from	  the	  limited	  options	  the	  Lula	  administration	  had	  for	  composing	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  legislative	  coalition	  that	  Cardoso	  enjoyed.”	  3	  	  Several	  top	  Workers’	  Party	  (PT)	  officials	  were	  implicated	  in	  this	  vote	  –	  buying	  scheme.	  	  The	  scandal	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  convictions	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  people,	  including	  Lula’s	  former	  chief	  of	  staff,	  José	  Dirceu	  de	  Oliveira	  e	  Silva,	  who	  has	  more	  recently	  been	  sentenced	  to	  23	  years	  in	  jail	  in	  the	  Lava	  Jato	  corruption	  scheme.	  	  There	  are	  so	  many	  corruption	  scandals	  currently	  in	  play	  in	  the	  investigation	  and	  sentencing	  phases,	  that	  only	  the	  experts	  can	  keep	  straight	  the	  modalities	  of	  
Mensalão,	  Lava	  Jato,	  Petrolão,	  Zelotes,	  and	  Operation	  Aequalis	  to	  mention	  only	  the	  biggest	  and	  most	  current.	  So	  far	  the	  wave	  of	  illegal,	  extralegal,	  and	  simply	  corrupt	  practices	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  impeachment	  hearing	  of	  President	  Rousseff,	  the	  investigation	  of	  ex-­‐President	  Lula,	  the	  conviction	  of	  84	  persons	  for	  crimes	  associated	  with	  Lava	  Jato,	  the	  majority	  of	  them	  politicians	  and	  businessmen.	  While	  not	  all	  of	  the	  crimes	  involve	  politicians,	  most	  of	  them	  do,	  and	  virtually	  all	  of	  them	  involve	  sources	  of	  funds,	  as	  in	  Petrobras,	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  State,	  and	  thus	  of	  necessity	  involve	  politicians.	  	   	  	   It	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  corruption	  is	  nothing	  new	  in	  Brazil.	  	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  late	  Samuel	  Huntington	  in	  his	  influential	  Political	  Order	  in	  Changing	  
Societies	  corruption	  is	  seen	  in	  positive	  terms	  in	  the	  process	  of	  modernization.	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Huntington	  calls	  specific	  attention	  to	  Brazil.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  influential	  article	  published	  in	  1990	  in	  the	  important	  Revista	  de	  Administração	  Pública	  of	  the	  Fundação	  Getúlio	  Vargas	  by	  Anna	  Maria	  Campos	  that	  argues	  in	  great	  detail	  why	  there	  is	  no	  concept	  or	  meaning	  to	  the	  term	  “accountability”	  in	  Portuguese.	  Most	  Brazilian	  and	  foreign	  authors	  refer	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  propensity	  to	  use	  “angles”	  or	  “gimmicks”,	  jeitinhos,	  to	  get	  around	  laws.	  Or,	  as	  was	  said	  in	  positive	  terms	  of	  a	  mayor	  of	  São	  Paulo,	  he	  robs	  but	  he	  accomplishes	  things.	  Rouba	  mas	  faz.	  	   And,	  in	  line	  with	  Jungmann’s	  observations	  above,	  while	  politics	  has	  not	  changed,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  corruption	  to	  govern,	  what	  is	  now	  permissible	  in	  politics	  and	  business	  in	  general	  in	  Brazil	  is	  changing.	  	  There	  is	  no	  single	  cause	  for	  the	  change,	  and	  I	  have	  identified	  at	  least	  five.	  	   First,	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  created,	  or	  recreated,	  a	  large	  spectrum	  of	  oversight	  and	  investigation	  mechanisms,	  and	  these	  have	  been	  expanded	  in	  number	  during	  the	  intervening	  28	  years.	  Today	  they	  include	  the	  Comptroller	  General,	  the	  Accounting	  Tribunal,	  the	  Federal	  Police,	  the	  Public	  Ministry,	  and	  the	  courts.	  	  There	  is	  a	  huge	  literature	  on	  these	  institutions	  in	  both	  Portuguese	  and	  English,	  and	  the	  approach	  that	  I	  find	  most	  convincing	  to	  explain	  their	  increasing	  influence,	  culminating	  in	  the	  current	  wave	  of	  imprisonments,	  is	  that	  of	  Sérgio	  Praça	  and	  Matthew	  M.	  Taylor	  who	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  these	  institutions	  increases	  not	  by	  a	  single	  event	  or	  factor,	  but	  through	  bureaucratic	  interaction.	  	  The	  capacity	  increase	  is	  contingent	  and	  interactive.	  	  In	  short,	  these	  oversight,	  investigatory,	  and	  punishment	  institutions	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  specific	  national	  and	  international	  context,	  which	  is	  why	  I	  include	  the	  following	  four	  factors.	  	  	   Second,	  whereas	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  main	  weakness	  of	  the	  accountability	  mechanisms	  was	  the	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  courts,	  and	  especially	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  to	  process	  and	  convict	  individuals,	  today	  this	  is	  changing	  due	  to	  personalities	  and	  the	  gradual	  modification	  of	  processes	  similar	  to	  those	  noted	  in	  the	  prior	  paragraph.	  	  This	  change	  is	  best	  highlighted	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  Judge	  Sérgio	  Moro	  of	  Curitiba	  who	  has	  taken	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  Lava	  Jato	  scandal.	  He	  is	  extremely	  active	  not	  only	  in	  pursuing	  corruption,	  but	  also	  in	  writing	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  plea	  -­‐	  bargaining	  and	  the	  Italian	  experience	  in	  countering	  the	  mafia.	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   Third,	  much	  of	  the	  momentum	  to	  impeach	  President	  Rousseff	  is	  related	  to	  allegation	  of	  corruption	  involving	  the	  Workers’	  Party,	  and	  was	  established	  by	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  Senator	  Delcídio	  do	  Amaral,	  who	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  party	  in	  the	  Senate.	  He	  was	  arrested,	  and	  due	  to	  plea	  -­‐	  	  bargaining	  (delação	  
premiada)	  he	  provided	  information	  on	  the	  spread	  of	  corruption	  throughout	  the	  Brazilian	  government.	  	  Those	  familiar	  with	  criminal	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  aware	  that	  plea	  -­‐	  bargaining	  is	  probably	  the	  single	  most	  important	  mechanism	  for	  gathering	  evidence	  on	  white	  -­‐	  collar	  crime.	  Plea-­‐	  bargaining	  was	  established	  in	  Brazil	  only	  in	  2013	  with	  law	  12,850/2013.	  I	  have	  been	  informed	  by	  lawyers	  involved	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  plea	  –	  bargaining	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  several	  laws	  that	  were	  required	  for	  Brazil	  to	  reach	  OECD	  standards.	  	  Since	  June	  2015	  there	  was	  a	  Co-­‐
Operation	  Agreement	  in	  place	  between	  Brazil	  and	  the	  OECD,	  which	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  an	  OECD-­‐Brazil	  Programme	  of	  Work.	  	  	   Fourth,	  Brazil’s	  population	  of	  over	  200	  million	  is	  increasingly	  invested	  in	  the	  system.	  An	  important	  indicator	  of	  this	  vesting	  is	  their	  paying	  taxes.	  According	  to	  one	  source,	  in	  2013	  over	  50%	  of	  those	  who	  declared	  income,	  paid	  income	  tax,	  whereas	  a	  decade	  earlier	  only	  36%	  paid	  income	  tax.	  4	  Just	  as	  important,	  according	  to	  data	  analyzed	  by	  the	  Instituto	  Brasileiro	  de	  Planejamento	  e	  Tributação,	  of	  the	  thirty	  countries	  where	  taxes	  are	  the	  highest,	  Brazil	  is	  the	  worst	  in	  terms	  of	  return	  to	  the	  population	  in	  investments	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  life.	  	  	   Fifth,	  Brazilians	  are	  today	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  low	  return	  on	  investment	  for	  their	  high	  taxes.	  Indeed,	  the	  huge	  anti	  –	  government	  demonstrations	  in	  June	  2013	  were	  mainly	  caused	  by	  this	  awareness	  of	  high	  taxes,	  mediocre	  services	  in	  health,	  education,	  and	  transportation,	  while	  the	  government	  invested	  massively	  in	  stadiums	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  World	  Cup	  in	  soccer	  in	  2014	  and	  the	  Olympics	  in	  2016.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  all	  –	  pervasive	  radio	  and	  television	  stations	  there	  is	  today	  extremely	  high	  penetration	  by	  social	  media.	  According	  to	  comScore,	  which	  claims	  to	  be	  the	  global	  leader	  in	  digital	  analysis,	  Brazil	  leads	  the	  world	  with	  a	  99.9%	  reach	  of	  social	  media.	  And,	  with	  8.8	  hours	  of	  use	  in	  the	  month	  of	  June	  2015,	  Brazil	  is	  the	  world	  leader	  in	  that	  similar	  data	  for	  Europe	  is	  6.1	  hours,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  5.2	  hours.	  5	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   In	  sum,	  traditional	  politics,	  in	  which	  the	  lubricant	  is	  public	  funds,	  has	  now	  encountered	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  accountability	  mechanisms,	  supported	  by	  processes	  and	  attitudes,	  which	  no	  longer	  tolerate	  the	  traditional	  lackadaisical	  approach	  to	  ethics	  in	  politics.	  	  While	  the	  incentives	  to	  reform	  politics	  are	  not	  as	  obvious	  as	  they	  were	  to	  assert	  control	  over	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  intelligence	  services,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  present	  in	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  population	  and	  international	  organizations.	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